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OVERCOMING INTERPRETIVE
FORMALISM: LEGISLATIVE REVERSALS
OF JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY WAIVERS IN
THE ENVIRONMENTAL STATUTES
ROBERT V PER CIVAL *
The use of public law to protect the environment has been hindered
by the judiciary's use of statutory interpretation principles more appro-
priate for private law regimes. This problem is well illustrated by the
history of efforts to compel federally owned facilities to comply with
the environmental laws. Alarmed by severe environmental contamina-
tion at nuclear weapons plants and military installations, Congress re-
peatedly has declared that federal facilities must comply with the
environmental laws. Federal agencies, however, have successfully re-
sisted compliance with the laws by persuading courts to adopt exceed-
ingly narrow interpretations of legislative waivers of sovereign
immunity. Just last term the Supreme Court held in United States De-
partment of Energy (DOE) v. Ohio ' that federal facilities were immune
from liability to states for civil penalties for past violations of the Re-
source Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)2 or the Clean Water
* Associate Professor of Law and Director of the Environmental Law Program,
University of Maryland School of Law; B.A., Macalaster College, 1972; J.D., Stanford
University, 1978. The author would like to thank Jeanne Grasso and Maureen
O'Doherty for research assistance with this article.
1. 112 S. Ct. 1627 (1992).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 6901 (1988).
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Act (CWA).3 This decision was based on the presumption, derived
from private law, that waivers of sovereign immunity are to be nar-
rowly construed.
In a reaction remarkably similar to its response to two previous
Supreme Court decisions limiting state enforcement against federal fa-
cilities,4 Congress quickly adopted legislation overriding a major por-
tion of DOE v. Ohio. Less than six months after the Court's decision,
Congress enacted the Federal Facility Compliance Act of 1992 (the
Act).' The Act, signed into law on October 6, 1992, expressly autho-
rizes states to impose civil .penalties on federal facilities that violate
RCRA.6 The purpose of the legislation was to override not only DOE
v. Ohio, but also a portion of the Court's holding in Gwaltney of Smith-
field v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc. , a decision narrowly constru-
ing the citizen suit provisions of the environmental laws.8
This Article argues that this pattern of legislative reversals of
Supreme Court decisions9 indicates that the judiciary has been inter-
3. 33 U.S.C. § 1231 (1988).
4. See Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167 (1976) (holding that a Clean Air Act require-
ment that federal facilities comply with state "requirements respecting control and
abatement of air pollution" was not a sufficiently clear and unambiguous waiver of in-
tergovernmental immunity to permit application of state permit requirements to federal
facilities). Congress overruled this case with the enactment of the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 7418 (1988)). See also EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Con-
trol Bd., 426 U.S. 200 (1976) (holding that a Clean Water Act requirement that federal
facilities comply with stati "requirements respecting control and abatement of pollu-
tion" was not a sufficiently clear and unambiguous waiver of intergovernmental immu-
nity to permit application of state permit requirements to federal facilities). The
enactment of the Clean Water Act of 1977 also overrode this case. See Pub. L. No. 95-
217, 91 Stat. 1566 (1977) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1323 (1988)).
5. Federal Facility Compliance Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-386, 105 Stat. 1505
(1992).
6. Id.
7. 484 U.S. 49 (1987).
8. In Gwaltney, the Supreme Court interpreted the citizen suit provisions contained
in most federal environmental statutes to preclude suits seeking penalties for past viola-
tions. Id. at 67. The Federal Facility Compliance Act overrides this decision with
respect to suits against federal facilities by expressly authorizing suits seeking penalties
for past violations.
9. This pattern of legislative reversals of interpretations of the environmental stat-
utes is part of a larger trend of congressional action to override judicial interpretations
of public law. For a comprehensive compilation of instances in which Congress has
overturned Supreme Court interpretations of these statutes, see William N. Eskridge,
Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE, L.J. 331,
338 (1991). Eskridge identifies 101 instances in which Congress overrode Supreme
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preting the environmental statutes by applying principles of statutory
construction that are ill suited to a public law regime. The Article
describes why this has impeded the implementation and enforcement
of public law, focusing on the DOE v. Ohio decision and the traditional
rule that waivers of sovereign immunity should be narrowly construed.
Part I discusses the history of efforts to subject public entities to the
environmental laws. Part II examines enforcement problems at federal
facilities. The article then analyzes the Supreme Court's opinion in
DOE v. Ohio in part III, and in part IV discusses the enactment of the
Federal Facility Compliance Act. The article finds that, although Con-
gress has responded to narrow judicial interpretations of waivers of
sovereign immunity by enacting clarifying legislation, such narrow
readings have impeded the effective implementation of the environmen-
tal statutes and forced greater accommodation of interests that did not
prevail in the initial legislative process.
I. APPLICATION OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS TO FEDERAL
FACILITIES
Since first establishing comprehensive regulatory programs to pro-
tect the environment in 1970,10 Congress has consistently sought to
apply the environmental laws to public and private entities alike.
Aided by narrow judicial interpretations of sovereign immunity waiv-
ers contained in the statutes, federal agencies have resisted efforts to
require their compliance with these laws. The following section re-
views the history of legislative efforts to apply the environmental laws
to federal facilities.11
A. Early Efforts to Apply Environmental Law to Federal Facilities
Prior to the establishment of national regulatory programs, Congress
encouraged federal agencies to cooperate with state environmental offi-
Court statutory interpretation decisions between 1975 and 1990. His list, however, is
not entirely comprehensive because it fails to include the 1977 Amendments to the
Clean Water Act that overrode EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Con-
trol Bd., 426 U.S. 200 (1976).
10. See, e.g., National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1988); Clean
Air Act Amendments, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (1988).
11. For a more detailed history of federal waivers of sovereign immunity in the
environmental statutes, see Kenneth M. Murchison, Reforming Environmental Enforce-
ment: Lessons from Twenty Years of Waiving Federal Immunity to State Regulation, 11
VA. ENvTL. L.J. 179 (1991-92).
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cials, but it did not require federal facilities to comply with state envi-
ronmental laws. In the 1956 Water Pollution Control Act, 12 Congress
directed federal agencies to cooperate with any state or local agency
responsible for controlling water pollution "insofar as practicable and
consistent with the interests of the United States and within any avail-
able appropriations." 13 Expressing its desire that federal facilities co-
operate with air pollution control agencies, Congress included virtually
identical language in amendments to the forerunner to the modem day
Clean Air Act. 4 Consistent with the then-prevailing view that envi-
ronmental protection was a state and local responsibility, neither of
these acts established federal pollution control regulations. Instead,
they provided financial assistance to encourage states to develop their
own pollution control programs.
During the 1960s, environmentalists criticized federal agencies, com-
plaining that they ignored environmental considerations and excluded
the public from input into decisions affecting the environment.' 5 Con-
gress enacted the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
(NEPA)"6 to make federal agencies more responsive to environmental
concerns. In an executive order designed to implement NEPA, Presi-
dent Nixon directed federal agencies to operate their facilities in a man-
ner that would conform to state air and water quality standards and
implementation plans. 7
Beginning in 1970, when it enacted legislation establishing the first
national regulatory program to protect the environment, Congress
shifted its approach from one of encouraging cooperation to one re-
quiring compliance. In order to make environmental laws equally ap-
plicable to public and private entities, Congress specified in the Clean
Air Act that, unless specifically exempted by the President, federal fa-
cilities "shall comply with federal, state, interstate, and local require-
ments respecting control and abatement of air pollution to the same
extent that any person is subject to such requirements."'" Congress
12. Water Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. No. 84-660, 970 Stat. 498, 506 (1956).
13. Id.
14. Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 86-365, § 2, 73 Stat. 646, 646 (1959).
15. See, e.g., JOSEPH SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT 60-61 (1970).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1988).
17. Exec. Order 11,507, 35 Fed. Reg. 2573 (1970).
18. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 5, 84 Stat. 1676,
1689 (1970) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1970)). The President could exempt
federal facilities only upon a determination that the paramount interests of the nation
required the exemption. Id.
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included similar provisions in the other national pollution control pro-
grams, including the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972
(Clean Water Act), 19 the Noise Control Act of 1972,2o and the Safe
Drinking Water Act of 1974.21
In addition to requiring federal facilities to comply with environ-
mental regulations, the 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments included the
first citizen suit provision. Section 304 of the Act authorized citizens
to bring actions to enforce emissions standards against the United
States, or any other governmental instrumentality or agency, to the
extent permitted by the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution.22
This provision, which clearly authorized suits against federal facilities,
became the model for the citizen suit provisions included in the other
major federal environmental statutes.23 In 1972 Congress included a
19. Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 2, 86 Stat. 816, 875 (1972).
20. Pub. L. No. 92-574, § 4, 86 Stat. 1234, 1235 (1972).
21. Pub. L. No. 93-523, 88 Stat. 1660 (1974). In addition to including the language
used in the federal facilities provision of § 118 of the Clean Air Act, the 1972 Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments (Clean Water Act) directed federal agencies
to make "payment of reasonable service charges" required by state water pollution con-
trol authorities. Clean Water Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 2, 86 Stat. 816, 875 (1972)
(codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1323 (1988)). Congress probably included this
reference in anticipation that states would want to collect service charges to defray the
costs of implementing the Clean Water Act's new national permit program (the national
pollution discharge elimination system, or NPDES program), though the Supreme
Court declined to infer such congressional intent in EPA v. California ex rel. State
Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 216-17 (1976). States can operate the
NPDES program under delegated federal authority. The Clean Air Act did not require
a permit program until it was amended in 1990. The Safe Drinking Water Act also
specified that federal agencies were to comply with recordkeeping and reporting re-
quirements for any applicable underground injection control programs, and it author-
ized presidential exemptions only on grounds of national security. Safe Drinking Water
Act, Pub. L. No. 93-523, 88 Stat. 1660 (1974).
22. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 304, 84 Stat. 1676,
1706 (1970).
23. Beginning with § 304 of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, most of the
major federal environmental laws contain provisions authorizing citizens to sue viola-
tors of environmental regulations. See, eg., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1323 (1988);
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1988). The citizen suit
provisions of the environmental laws generally authorize "any person" to commence an
action against "any person" alleged to be in violation of the laws. Before filing a suit,
citizens usually must notify the alleged violator and federal and state authorities in or-
der to give them an opportunity to take action. Sixty days notice usually is required,
although some statutes have different waiting periods. For example, suits for violations
of RCRA, Subtitle C can be brought immediately after notice is given, 42 U.S.C.
§ 6972(b)(1)(A), while suits against persons contributing to an imminent and substan-
tial endangerment situation require 90 days notice under 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (b)(1)(A),
1993]
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similar provision in section 505 of the Clean Water Act.24 The Senate
committee report on the legislation emphasized the importance of al-
lowing citizens access to the courts in order to make the government
comply with its obligations under the Act.25
B. Judicial Interpretations of Sovereign Immunity Waivers
Federal agencies resisted congressional efforts to subject them to the
full range of state environmental regulations. State officials sued some
federal agencies that refused to comply with state permit requirements.
Citing the doctrine that waivers of sovereign immunity should be nar-
rowly construed, the agencies argued that they should not have to com-
ply with state procedural requirements, such as obtaining a permit, but
need only comply with substantive requirements. While this issue was
being litigated in federal court, President Nixon revoked his 1970 exec-
utive order that directed agencies to comply with state air and water
quality standards and implementation plans and replaced it with Exec-
utive Order 11,752.6 The new executive order, which was designed to
bolster the agencies' litigation position,27 distinguished between state
"substantive standards and limitations," with which federal compli-
ance was desirable, and "state or local administrative procedures with
respect to pollution abatement and control," with which compliance
was not required.28 In two 1976 cases, the Supreme Court relied upon
this distinction to support extraordinarily narrow constructions of the
(B). Citizen suits usually are barred if federal or state authorities are diligently prose-
cuting an action to require compliance. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(1)(B). The citizen suit
provisions also generally authorize suits against agencies for failing to perform nondis-
cretionary duties, a type of action-forcing litigation that can be useful to ensure that
agencies conduct required rulemaking activities. 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (a)(2).
24. Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 505, 86 Stat. 816, 888 (1972).
25. S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 80 (1971).
26. Exec. Order No. 11,507, 35 Fed. Reg. 2573 (1970), reprinted in 42 U.S.C.
§ 4331 (1988).
27. At least one state had relied upon Executive Order 11,507 to support its argu-
ment that federal facilities should be required to comply with state permit requirements.
See Alabama ex rel. Baxley v. Seeber, 502 F.2d 1238, 1248-49 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'd,
426 U.S. 932 (1976).
28. Executive Order 11,752 provided in pertinent part:
Compliance by Federal facilities with Federal, State, interstate, and local substan-
tive standards and substantive limitations, to the same extent that any person is
subject to such standards and limitations, will accomplish the objective of provid-
ing Federal leadership and cooperation in the prevention of environmental pollu-
tion. In light of the principle of Federal supremacy embodied in the Constitution,
this order is not intended, nor should it be interpreted, to require Federal facilities
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol43/iss1/8
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federal facilities provisions of the Clean Air Act and Clean Water
Act. 2
9
In Hancock v. Train,3" the Court held that federal facilities were not
required to obtain state operating permits pursuant to state plans im-
plementing the Clean Air Act. 31 Under an EPA-approved plan for im-
plementing and maintaining national ambient air quality standards,
Kentucky required all facilities emitting air pollutants to obtain a state
permit.32 In seeking to require facilities operated by the U.S. Army,
the Tennessee Valley Authority, and the Atomic Energy Commission
to apply for and obtain such operating permits, 33 Kentucky maintained
that it could not meet its primary responsibilities under the Act with-
out a permit program. While the Clean Air Act did not require states
to establish a permit program, virtually every state had done so to en-
sure compliance with federal air quality standards.34
The Supreme Court rejected Kentucky's argument that the state
could require federal facilities to obtain operating permits under sec-
tion 118 of the Clean Air Act.35 Citing both the Supremacy Clause
and the Plenary Powers Clause of the Constitution, the Court empha-
sized that only a "clear and unambiguous" congressional authorization
could waive federal immunity from state regulation.36 The Court nar-
rowly interpreted section 118 of the Clean Air Act, which provided
that federal facilities comply with "Federal, State, interstate, and local
requirements respecting control and abatement of air pollution to the
same extent that any person is subject to such requirements., 37 The
Court noted that section 118 did not require that federal installations
comply with "all federal, state, interstate, and local requirements to
the same extent as any other person," nor that they "comply with all
to comply with State or local administrative procedures with respect to pollution
abatement and control.
Exec. Order No. 11,752, 3 C.F.R. 380 (1974).
29. EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200
(1976); Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167 (1976).
30. 426 U.S. 167 (1976).
31. Id. at 180.
32. Id. at 172.
33. Id. at 174.
34. Id. at 180.
35. Hancock, 426 U.S. at 182.
36. Id. at 179 (quoting California ex reL State Water Resources Control Bd. v.
EPA, 511 F.2d 963, 968 (9th Cir. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 426 U.S. 200 (1976)).
37. See 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (1988).
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requirements of the applicable state implementation plan."'38 Distin-
guishing between substantive requirements, such as emissions stan-
dards and compliance schedules, and the procedural requirements that
are used to administer and enforce them, 39 the Court held that Con-
gress did not intend to require federal facilities to comply with state
procedural requirements.'
While noting that states could bring enforcement actions against fed-
eral facilities under the citizen suit provisions of section 304 of the
Act,4" the Court found it significant that section 304 mentioned only
suits to enforce emissions standards or limitations and did not ex-
pressly provide for enforcement of state permit requirements.42 The
Court noted that its holding was founded on the traditional presump-
tion that waivers of sovereign immunity are to be construed narrowly,
and that if it had misinterpreted congressional intent, Congress could
amend the act to make its intentions clear.43
In the companion case to Hancock, EPA v. California ex rel. State
Water Resources Control Board,' the Supreme Court held that federal
facilities were not required to obtain state permits even under the Clean
Water Act's national permit program. 45 The Court again based its
holding on the notion that waivers of sovereign immunity should be
construed narrowly.46 Unlike the Clean Air Act, which then did not
mandate the use of operating permits, the Clean Water Act required
the establishment of a national permit program that states could oper-
ate under delegated authority from EPA.47 The Court dismissed this
distinction, noting that states were not required to administer the
Clean Water Act permit program while the Clean Air Act did require
states to develop implementation plans.48
38. Hancock, 426 U.S. at 187.
39. Id. at 185.
40. Id. at 189.
41. Id. at 195-96. The Court noted that § 304 of the Clean Air Act authorizes suits
by "any person" and § 302(e) includes a "State" in the definition of a "person." Id.
42. Id. at 198.
43. Hancock, 426 U.S. at 198. In a footnote, the Court noted that legislation ex-
panding the waiver of sovereign immunity had been reported out of a Senate committee.
Id. at 198 n.64.
44. 426 U.S. 200 (1976).
45. Id. at 227.
46. Id. at 211.
47. Id. at 223.
48. Id. at 226.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol43/iss1/8
OVERCOMING INTERPRETIVE FORMALISM
The federal facilities provision contained in section 313 of the Clean
Water Act was virtually identical to section 118 of the Clean Air Act,
but it also specified that federal facilities must comply with require-
ments for the "payment of reasonable service charges."'49 The
Supreme Court declined to accept the reasoning of the court of appeals
that Congress must have intended that federal facilities obtain state
permits because there would be no reason to order them to pay fees for
a permit that they were not required to obtain. The Court found no
clear indication that such service charges were associated with
permits.50
While conceding that exempting federal facilities from state permit
requirements would make it difficult for states to coordinate and ad-
minister water quality standards, the Court maintained that this was
not an adequate reason for finding a clear waiver of sovereign immu-
nity.51 As in Hancock, the Court observed that if it had misinterpreted
congressional intent, Congress could make its intention manifest in
subsequent legislation.52 In fact, that is precisely what Congress did
shortly after the Supreme Court announced its decisions.
C. Legislation Overriding Narrow Constructions of Sovereign
Immunity Waivers
Just four months after the Court decided Hancock and Water Re-
sources Control Board, Congress enacted comprehensive federal haz-
ardous waste legislation known as the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA).53 While a House committee had proposed
that EPA be given exclusive enforcement authority against federal fa-
cilities,54 Congress instead adopted an even more expansive waiver of
49. Section 313 specified that federal facilities "shall comply with Federal, State,
interstate, and local requirements respecting the control and abatement of pollution to
the same extent that any person is subject to such requirements, including the payment
of reasonable service charges." 33 U.S.C. § 1323 (1988).
50. Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S. at 216-17.
51. Id. at 220-21.
52. Id. at 228.
53. 42 U.S.C. § 6361 (1988).
54. The House committee report on the legislation mentioned the Supreme Court's
decisions in Hancock and Water Resources Control Board and noted that considerable
controversy persisted concerning efforts to bring federal facilities into compliance with
the environmental laws. H.R. REP. No. 1491, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 45 (1976), reprinted
in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6238, 6283. Relying on a recommendation made by the Admin-
istrative Conference of the United States prior to the Supreme Court decisions, the com-
mittee recommended that EPA assume exclusive responsibility for enforcing hazardous
1993]
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federal sovereign immunity in section 6001 of RCRA. Responding to
the Hancock Court's observation that Congress had not specified that
federal facilities must comply with all requirements, Congress inserted
the word "all" into the statute and specified that this included "re-
quirements, both substantive and procedural (including any require-
ment for permits or reporting or any provisions for injunctive relief and
such sanctions as may be imposed by a court to enforce such relief),...
including the payment of reasonable service charges."5 5 Congress also
specified that neither federal agencies nor employees would be immune
"from any process or sanction of any State or Federal Court with re-
spect to the enforcement of any such injunctive relief,"'5 6 and that only
the President could exempt federal facilities from compliance by deter-
mining that it "is in the paramount interest of the U.S."57 The Presi-
dent's authority to exempt federal facilities was limited by providing
that such an exemption could not be premised on lack of funds for
compliance unless Congress denied a specific presidential request for
an appropriation for this purpose.5"
The year after it enacted RCRA, Congress adopted extensive
amendments to the Clean Air Act,59 the Clean Water Act,"° and the
Safe Drinking Water Act.61 In these amendments Congress adopted
new federal facilities provisions expressly designed to override Han-
cock and Water Resources Control Board. The Senate committee re-
port on the Clean Air Act Amendments complained that the Supreme
Court, encouraged by federal agencies, had misconstrued Congress' in-
tent.62 The House committee report explained that in adopting section
118 of the Act it had intended to remove all legal barriers to full federal
compliance, except where it expressly provided exemption authority.
The report stated that Congress had intended to waive the historic de-
waste regulations applicable to federal facilities. Id. at 6289. While the bill reported by
the House committee would have given EPA authority to issue compliance orders and
to file civil enforcement actions against other federal facilities upon 30 days notice, this
proposal was not adopted.
55. 42 U.S.C. § 6961 (1988).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977).
60. Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (1977).
61. Pub. L. No. 95-190, 91 Stat. 1399 (1977).
62. S. REP. No. 370, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 67 (1977), reprinted in 1977
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4326, 4371-75.
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fense of sovereign immunity and to establish, as a matter of federal law,
the duty of federal facilities to abide by all state and local substantive
and procedural emission control requirements.6 3
The report concluded that Congress had "intended to settle these
matters once and for all" by enacting section 118. The House commit-
tee indicated that the 1977 amendments were "intended to overturn the
Hancock case and to express, with sufficient clarity, the committee's
desire to subject Federal facilities to all Federal, State, and local re-
quirements - procedural, substantive, or otherwise - process, and
sanctions." Congress inserted the word "all" as a modifier to "re-
quirements" in section 118 and specified that the waiver applied to any
requirements whatsoever, including requirements respecting permits,
"to the exercise of any Federal, State, or local administrative authority,
and to any process and sanction, whether enforced in Federal, State, or
local courts or in any other manner. '65
The House committee report explained that federal facilities and
agencies could be "subject to injunctive relief, criminal or civil con-
tempt citations to enforce injunctions, to civil or criminal penalties,
and to delayed compliance penalties. ' 66 The report expressed the ex-
pectation that the amendment would end delays, excuses, or evasions
by federal agencies and, except in the case of a presidential exemption
in the interests of national security, would mandate complete
compliance. 6
7
Congress inserted virtually identical language into the Safe Drinking
Water Act and into section 313 of the Clean Water Act by amend-
ments adopted in 1977.68 The amendment to the Clean Water Act,
however, added the qualification that "the United States shall be liable
only for those civil penalties arising under Federal law or imposed by a
State or local court to enforce an order or the process of such court."6 9
An executive order issued by President Carter in 1978 directed federal
63. H.R. REP. No. 240, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 67 (1977), reprinted in 1977
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1077, 1276-77.
64. 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1277-78.
65. 42 U.S.C. § 7418(b) (1988). Congress also amended § 118 to specify that no
federal employee "shall be personally liable for any civil penalty for which he is not
otherwise liable." Id.
66. H.R. REP. No. 240, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 200 (1977), reprinted in 1977
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1077, 1279.
67. Id.
68. 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a)(2) (1988).
69. Id.
19931
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facilities to comply with environmental standards established under the
major federal statutes and provided that they shall be subject to "the
same substantive, procedural, and other requirements that would apply
to a private person."7 °
Thus, more than fifteen years ago, Congress made it abundantly
clear that, in the absence of a presidential exemption, it intended to
require federal facilities to comply with the same environmental stan-
dards and to be subject to the same enforcement sanctions as private
parties. In subsequent years, virtually every time Congress
reauthorized the major federal environmental statutes, it strengthened
their enforcement provisions and increased the specificity with which it
enunciated the policy of equal application of the law to public and pri-
vate entities.71
II. COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT PROBLEMS AT FEDERAL
FACILITIES
A. Environmental Problems at Federal Facilities
Despite Congress' efforts to apply the environmental law to federal
facilities, such facilities have created some of the most severe environ-
mental problems facing the nation today. As of February 1992, the
National Priorities List for cleanup under the Superfund program
listed 116 federal facilities. As of February 1993, EPA's Federal
Agency Hazardous Waste Compliance Docket lists 1,930 federal facili-
ties.72 Environmental contamination at federal facilities is so severe
that the Congressional Budget Office estimates that the federal govern-
ment now actually spends more money trying to bring its own facilities
into compliance with the environmental laws than it does in adminis-
tering and enforcing the laws against private parties.73
70. Exec. Order No. 12,088, 3 C.F.R. 243 (1978). Exec. Order No. 12,580, 3
C.F.R. 193 (1988), issued by President Reagan, superseded Carter's executive order.
71. See, e.g., Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
616, 98 Stat. 3221 (1984); Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 7
(1987); Medical Waste Tracking Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-582, 102 Stat. 2954
(1988); 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990).
As Kenneth Murchison notes with respect to waivers of federal sovereign immunity,
"the more recent the waiver, the more inclusive it tends to be." Murchison, supra note
11, at 187.
72. 58 Fed. Reg. 7298 (1993). The Federal Agency Hazardous Waste Compliance
Docket includes facilities being evaluated for inclusion on the National Priorities List.
73. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, FEDERAL LIABILITIES UNDER HAZARD-
ous WASTE LAWS, S. Doc. No. 95, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
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Nuclear weapons plants managed by the U.S. Department of Energy
(DOE) have left a legacy of extreme levels of environmental contami-
nation. In a July 1988 report, DOE estimated that the cost of cleaning
up environmental contamination at the nuclear weapons complex
would range from $66 to $110 billion.74 The General Accounting Of-
fice believes that the total bill will range from $100 to $130 billion.7 5
Contamination at Department of Defense (DOD) installations also is a
serious problem. DOD estimates that it will cost more than $1 billion
and take nearly a decade to decontaminate just the military bases or-
dered closed in 1988.76 The Bush Administration's budget request for
the fiscal year 1993 included a total of $3.7 billion to clean up pollution
at closed and active military bases and $5.5 billion for decontamination
of the nuclear weapons complex.7 7
Problems at federal facilities are the legacy of decades of environ-
mental neglect. At its uranium processing center in Fernald, Ohio,
DOE released more than 300,000 pounds of uranium particles into the
air in thirty-five years.7 8 More than 200 billion gallons of radioactive
and hazardous waste contaminate unlined trenches and pits at the
Hanford Nuclear Reservation in the State of Washington.79 In 1986,
the federal government revealed that it had deliberately concealed dis-
charges of radioactive air and water pollutants that occurred at Han-
ford over the period from 1944 to 1971.80 On June 6, 1989, a team of
FBI agents raided the Rocky Flats plutonium processing facility near
Denver, Colorado to seize evidence of criminal violations of the envi-
ronmental laws. Safety problems led to a temporary shutdown of the
plant in November 1989, and congressional investigators have esti-
mated that the cost of cleaning up its radioactive and hazardous wastes
74. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, ENVIRONMENT, SAFETY, AND HEALTH RE-
PORT FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY DEFENSE COMPLEX (July 1988).
75. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEALING WITH PROBLEMS IN THE Nu-
CLEAR DEFENSE COMPLEX EXPECTED TO COST OVER $100 BILLION (July 1988).
76. Keith Schneider, Toxic Pollution at Military Sites is Posing a Crisis, N.Y. TIMES,
June 30, 1991, at Al.
77. Barry Cushman, Bush to Ask More for Base Cleanups, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24,
1992, at A15. This substantially exceeds EPA's FY1993 budget request of $7 billion.
Id.
78. H.R. REP. No. 111, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1991).
79. Dan W. Reicher & Jason Salzman, One Hundred Billion Dollars and Counting,
6 ENVTL. FORUM 15, 16 (Jan./Feb. 1989).
80. Keith Schneider, Nuclear Complex Poses Risk for Indians, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3,
1990, at A9.
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could exceed $7 billion."1
B. Enforcement Authorities
When it has reauthorized the major federal environmental statutes,
Congress repeatedly has strengthened their enforcement provisions, in-
creasing the size of possible penalties and broadening the range of en-
forcement authorities. The environmental laws now authorize judicial
enforcement actions seeking both civil and criminal penalties and equi-
table relief, 2 The principal pollution control statutes also authorize
EPA to assess civil penalties administratively. Polluters may contest
such penalties in hearings before an administrative law judge. Civil
penalty decisions are subject to judicial review based on the administra-
tive record.8 3
Civil and criminal penalties are designed to punish violators and to
deter violations of the environmental laws. EPA has developed a "Pol-
icy on Civil Penalties" designed to ensure that penalties imposed on
violators recoup the economic benefit of violations while encouraging
81. Keith Schneider, Study Foresees Closing Most Nuclear Arms Plants, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 7, 1991, at B12. Problems at Rocky Flats did not occur without warning.
On February 11, 1970, the day the New York Times reported on President Nixon's
landmark 1970 message to Congress on the environment, see Robert B. Semple, Jr.,
President Offers Plan for Cleanup of Air and Water, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1970, at Al,
another article on the front page reported a warning from a group of Colorado scientists
that plutonium released into the air, water, and soil from Rocky Flats posed "a serious
threat to the health and safety of the people of Denver." Anthony Ripley, Colorado
Atom Plant Is Called Radiation Hazard, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1970, at Al. While
acknowledging that small amounts of plutonium had been released from the Rocky
Flats plant, officials of the Atomic Energy Commission stated that the amount was too
"minuscule" to pose any hazard to public health. The scientists had been investigating
the impact of a major accident that occurred at the facility in May 1969 when pluto-
nium caught fire in a workroom. To their surprise they discovered plutonium deposits
not connected with the fire, but rather from years of environmental contamination from
the plant. A spokesman for Dow Chemical Company, the government contractor who
operated the plant, dismissed the scientists' warning as "just not credible." 1d.
82. Most of the federal environmental statutes provide for criminal penalties for
"knowing" or "willful" violations of environmental regulations. See, e.g., Clean Water
Act § 309(c), 33 U.S.C. § 1319g (1988) ("knowingly"); RCRA § 3008(d) & (e), 42
U.S.C. § 6928 (1988) ("knowingly"); Clean Air Act § 113(c), 42 U.S.C. § 7413 (1988)
("knowingly"); CERCLA § 103(b), (c) & (d)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1988) ("willfully").
The Clean Water Act goes even further by making negligent violations of the Act crimi-
nal. See, eg., United States v. Frezzo Bros., Inc., 703 F.2d 62 (3rd Cir. 1983) (uphold-
ing criminal sanctions for willfully and negligently discharging pollutants into U.S.
waterways), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 829 (1983).
83. See generally Jonathan D. Libber, Penalty Assessment at the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency: A View from Inside, 35 S.D. L. REv. 189 (1990).
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future compliance. Under this policy, civil penalties are calculated
based on: the economic benefit of delayed compliance, as calculated by
a computer program developed by the EPA's staff; the gravity of the
offense, based on its actual and potential impact on public health and
the environment and its effect on the EPA's ability to perform its regu-
latory functions; the willfulness of the offense; and the violator's past
compliance and cooperation with enforcement authorities."
Until recently, federal facilities have had little incentive to take ac-
tion to bring their operations into compliance with environmental laws.
The minimal threat of enforcement action, coupled with limited budg-
ets for environmental compliance, contributed to federal agencies' per-
vasive neglect of environmental standards."5 The Justice Department's
insistence that it would violate constitutional principles of separation of
powers to allow one executive agency to sue another has limited the
EPA's ability to pursue enforcement actions against facilities operated
by other federal agencies.8 6 While Congress has required EPA to
reach formal remedial action agreements with federal facilities on the
National Priorities List for cleanup under the Superfund program
(known as CERCLA)" the agency otherwise has been "essentially
limited to arm twisting and cajolery with respect to its sister
agencies." 8
8
In 1988, a congressional committee found that EPA has little success
in obtaining administrative consent orders or enforceable compliance
agreements with federal facilities. 9 DOE did agree in 1991 to pay a
$100,000 fine for its failure to comply with a remedial action agreement
84. See generally Libber, supra note 83.
85. Despite considerable effort in recent years to improve the compliance record of
federal facilities, the frequency of significant violations of the environmental laws at
such facilities remains high and significantly greater than at private industrial facilities.
See Susan L. Smith, Shields for the King's Men: Official Immunity and Other Obstacles
to Effective Prosecution of Federal Officials for Environmental Crimes, 16 COLUM. 3.
ENVTL. L. 1, 4-5 (1991).
86. These arguments are criticized in Michael Herz, United States v. United States:
When Can the Federal Government Sue Itselfl, 32 WM. & MARY L. REv. 893 (1991).
87. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 42
U.S.C. § 9620(e)(2).
88. Donald W. Stever, Perspectives on the Problem of Federal Facility Liability for
Environmental Contamination, 17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,114 (1987).
89. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, COMPLI-
ANCE WITH HAZARDOUS WASTE LAWS, MEMORANDUM FROM SUBCOMM. ON OVER-
SIGHT & INVESTIGATIONS OF HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY & COMMERCE (June 3,
1988).
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reached with EPA under CERCLA, but such penalties are rare and
unlikely to have much impact on a $20 billion department.' ° While
EPA could levy civil penalties against private contractors that operate
many federal facilities, clauses in their government contracts often enti-
tle such contractors to automatic reimbursement of such fines from the
federal government.9" Government contracts also may allow contrac-
tors to recover CERCLA cleanup expenses.92
In rare cases federal enforcement officials have brought criminal
prosecutions against federal employees. In United States v. Dee,93 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the
conviction of employees at a federal facility for criminal violations of
RCRA for the first time in a prosecution brought by the U.S. Attor-
ney's Office. The defendants, civilian engineers working for the U.S.
Army, were convicted for knowing violations of RCRA regulations.
The Fourth Circuit rejected the argument that sovereign immunity
barred the prosecution, stating that "even where federal officers enjoy
some immunity within a particular sphere of official actions, they are
not protected by general immunity from criminal prosecution." 94
In March 1992, Rockwell International Corporation, a federal con-
tractor that had operated the Rocky Flats nuclear weapons plant,
pleaded guilty to five felony and five misdemeanor violations of the
environmental laws. The company agreed to pay $18.5 million in fines
and to waive enforcement of a clause in its government contract that
could require DOE to compensate it for paying the fines.95 The
Rockwell plea bargain resulted in prosecution of the corporation only,
and not individual officials responsible for the violations. While the
90. Matthew L. Wald, Department to Pay Fine for Waste Cleanup, N.Y. TIMES,
May 14, 1991, at A10.
91. Catch 22 Language in Weapons Plant Contracts Impedes Safety Penalties, BAL-
TIMORE SUN, Sept. 26, 1989, at 18A. Donald Stever argues that indemnification clauses
in contracts should be written to void any indemnification for unlawful acts of the con-
tractor. Stever, supra note 88, at 10, 119. For a discussion of environmental indemnity
provisions, see Penny L. Parker & John Slavich, Contractual Efforts to Allocate the Risk
of Environmental Liability: Is There a Way to Make Indemnities Worth More Than the
Paper They Are Written On?, 44 Sw. L.J. 1349 (1991).
92. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DOD ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP: INFOR-
MATION ON CONTRACTOR CLEANUP COSTS AND DOD REIMBURSEMENTS (June
1992).
93. 912 F.2d 741 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1307 (1991).
94. Id. at 744.
95. Matthew L. Wald, Judge Accepts Plea on Waste A-Bomb Site, N.Y. TIMES, June
.2, 1992, at A12.
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Justice Department argues that the decision not to indict individuals
was proper because they were only following years of company pol-
icy,96 members of the grand jury have complained bitterly that they
wanted to indict employees of both DOE and Rockwell, but were over-
ruled by the U.S. Attorney. 97
C. State Enforcement Actions Against Federal Facilities
Most federal environmental laws rely heavily on state authorities,
subject to federal supervision, to administer and enforce the national
programs. The principal federal pollution control statutes authorize
EPA to delegate the authority to administer and enforce environmental
programs to states that meet minimum federal requirements. Thus,
while the federal government drafts the regulations, state and local
governments enforce them.9" The federal government's inability to
achieve effective enforcement of the environmental laws that apply to
federal facilities leaves the states in which such facilities are located
with an even greater enforcement burden.
While the environmental laws generally apply to federal facilities,
states have had great difficulty enforcing them against federal violators.
Citing the principle that waivers of sovereign immunity are to be nar-
rowly construed, federal agencies have asserted numerous defenses to
state environmental enforcement actions. In some cases, federal agen-
cies have challenged the states' ability to impose certain substantive
requirements on them.99 In other cases the agencies have argued that
96. Matthew L. Wald, Testimony Blocked on Bomb Factory, Agent Says, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 27, 1992, at A28.
97. Thomas W. Lippman, Justice Defends Plea Bargain in Rocky Flats Case, WASH.
PosT, Oct. 1, 1992, at A3. In a scathing report to the court, the grand jury charged that
officials of both DOE and Rockwell conspired to violate the environmental laws and
that the violations continued even after the plant was searched by FBI agents. Matthew
L. Wald, New Disclosures Over Bomb Plant, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1992, at A23. The
grand jury concluded that "the D.O.E. explicitly discouraged Rockwell from complying
with environmental laws" and that "Rockwell conspired with certain D.O.E. officials
over a period of years to hide its illegal acts and the illegal acts of its employees behind
the sovereign immunity [of D.O.E.]" Id.
98. Barry Breen, Federal Supremacy and Sovereign Immunity Waivers in Federal
Environmental Law, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,326 (1985).
99. See, e.g., Parola v. Weinberger, 848 F.2d 956 (9th Cir. 1988) (rejecting argu-
ment that reference to "hazardous waste disposal" in federal facilities provision in
§ 6001 of RCRA does not extend the waiver of federal immunity to cover violations
involving the collection of waste); United States v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Envtl. Re-
sources, 778 F. Supp. 1328 (M.D. Pa. 1991) (rejecting argument that CERCLA waived
sovereign immunity only for state laws that were the equivalent of a "mini-CERCLA");
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regulatory fees charged by states are actually impermissible taxes on
federal property."c° Among the most potent arguments federal agen-
cies have made is that, except for violations of previously imposed in-
junctions, the environmental laws have not waived federal immunity
from the imposition of civil penalties. Prior to the Supreme Court's
decision in DOE v. Ohio, the lower federal courts' response to this ar-
gument was mixed. l 1
United States v. Colorado, No. 89-C-1646 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13138 (D. Col. Au-
gust 14, 1991) (holding that § 113(h) of CERCLA deprives courts of jurisdiction over
state enforcement action once site is listed on the NPL); Colorado v. U.S. Dep't of
Army, 707 F. Supp. 1562 (D. Col. 1989) (holding that a pending CERCLA suit did not
preclude state enforcement of RCRA for a site not yet listed on the NPL); New York v.
U.S. Dep't of Defense, 620 F. Supp. 374 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding that the Clean Water
Act did not waive sovereign immunity for violations of state water quality standards);
Kelley v. U.S. Dep't of Transp., 618 F. Supp. 1103 (W.D. Mich. 1985) (holding that the
Clean Water Act did not waive sovereign immunity from state enforcement action in-
volving groundwater contamination); Florida Dep't of Envtl. Regulation v. Silvex
Corp., 606 F. Supp. 159 (N.D. Mich. 1985) (holding that RCRA's federal facilities
provision does not waive federal immunity from enforcement of state law imposing
strict liability for releases of hazardous waste).
100. See, e.g., New York Dep't of Envtl. Conservation v. U.S. Dep't of Energy, 772
F. Supp. 91 (N.D.N.Y. 1991) (postponing decision on the question of whether state
regulatory fees are an impermissible tax because they are unreasonable in relation to the
services rendered by the state); United States v. South Coast Air Quality Management
Dist., 748 F. Supp. 732 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (rejecting argument that federal government is
immune under the Clean Air Act from payment of air quality management district's
fees).
101. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Lujan, 931 F.2d 1421 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that
Congress has not waived the federal government's sovereign immunity from liability for
punitive or civil penalties imposed on federal facility for past violations of the Clean
Water Act), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1927 (1992); Mitzelfelt v. Department of Air Force, 903
F.2d 1293 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that the federal facilities provision of RCRA does
not waive federal sovereign immunity from imposition of civil penalties); United States
v. Washington, 872 F.2d 874 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that RCRA federal facilities pro-
vision did not waive federal sovereign immunity from civil penalties); California v. U.S.
Dep't of Navy, 845 F.2d 222 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that the federal facilities provision
of the Clean Water Act does not waive federal immunity from civil penalties); United
States v. Air Pollution Control Bd., No. 3:88-1030 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18996 (M.D.
Tenn. Feb. 28, 1990) (rejecting argument that federal facilities are immune from imposi-
tion of civil penalties under the Clean Air Act); Metropolitan Sanitary Dist. of Greater
Chicago v. United States, 737 F. Supp. 51 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (holding that sovereign im-
munity bars claim for civil penalties under the Clean Water Act where penalties did not
arise under federal law); Maine v. U.S. Dep't of Navy, 702 F. Supp. 322 (D. Me. 1988)
(holding that federal facilities provision of RCRA waives federal immunity from civil
penalties), vacated, 973 F.2d 1007 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding that United States did not
waive sovereign immunity from civil or punitive penalties in either RCRA or CER-
CLA); McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. Weinberger, 655 F. Supp. 601 (E.D.
Cal. 1986) (holding that the Clean Water Act does not unambiguously waive federal
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Justice Department officials argued that allowing states to impose
civil penalties for environmental violations by federal agencies would
provide a convenient means for states to line their coffers at federal
expense and would disrupt federal priorities for environmental compli-
ance.102 Proponents of allowing states to impose civil penalties argue
that such authority is crucial to effective enforcement against federal
facilities and that there already are means for preventing abuse, includ-
ing the right to remove state enforcement actions to federal court.10 3
Courts and scholars assumed that states at least could use the citizen
suit provisions to require federal violators to pay civil penalties1" that
would be returned to the U.S. Treasury."0 Nonetheless, in California
v. Department of Navy,"° a federal district court held that states can-
not avail themselves of the citizen suit provisions of the Clean Water
Act because they are not "citizens" within the meaning of the
statute. 107
If states were not allowed to impose civil penalties on federal entities,
it would be difficult for them to deter environmental violations at fed-
eral facilities. While knowing violations of the environmental laws can
be the grounds for criminal prosecutions, there are substantial barriers
to states conducting such prosecutions. Environmental crimes at fed-
eral facilities generally occur on property considered to be federal en-
claves over which the federal government asserts exclusive criminal
jurisdiction.' °8 In California v. Walters,1" 9 the Ninth Circuit held that
sovereign immunity from civil penalties); Alabama ex rel. Graddick v. Veterans' Ad-
min., 648 F. Supp. 1208 (M.D. Ala. 1986) (rejecting argument that the Clean Air Act
had not waived federal immunity from state enforcement actions seeking civil penal-
ties); Meyer v. U.S. Coast Guard, 644 F. Supp. 221 (E.D.N.C. 1986) (holding that
RCRA does not waive federal immunity from civil penalties).
102. Stewart Reflects on DOJ's Status, Limits in Environmental Enforcement, Liti-
gation, 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1564 (Dec. 14, 1990).
103. 20 U.S.C. § 1441 (1988). See Murchison, supra note 11, at 203, 208.
104. See, e.g., Illinois v. Outboard Marine Corp., 680 F.2d 473 (7th Cir. 1982) (per-
mitting Illinois to intervene in a federal action against an Illinois industrial polluter of
Lake Michigan); Massachusetts v. U.S. Veterans' Admin., 541 F.2d 119 (Ist Cir. 1976)
(allowing Massachusetts to sue as a citizen under the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act). See also Stever, supra note 88, at 10,118-19.
105. See 31 U.S.C. § 3302 (1988).
106. 631 F. Supp 584 (N.D. Cal. 1986), aff'd, 845 F.2d 222 (9th Cir. 1988).
107. California v. U.S. Dep't of Navy, 845 F.2d 222 (9th Cir. 1988).
108. See generally Smith, supra note 85, at 23-24.
109. 751 F.2d 977 (9th Cir. 1984).
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RCRA's federal facilities provision.1 . had not waived the immunity of
the administrator of a Veterans' Administration hospital who was
prosecuted for misdemeanor violations of state laws governing medical
waste disposal.'11
In the absence of authority to impose a civil penalty, states must first
seek to obtain injunctive relief or to negotiate a compliance agreement
before federal facilities will be subject to any credible threat of sanc-
tions. Even after states have succeeded in reaching compliance agree-
ments with federal facilities, the federal agencies have often reneged on
their commitments or failed to meet compliance deadlines. In May
1989, the U.S. Department of Energy, EPA, and the State of Washing-
ton entered into an agreement for cleaning up extensive radioactive
waste contamination at the Hanford, Washington nuclear weapons
complex. The agreement established a schedule for attaining compli-
ance with federal and state environmental laws requiring construction
of a waste processing plant that would treat the most dangerous wastes
before they were immobilized in glass-like form. On January 30, 1991,
however, the Department of Energy provoked an angry reaction from
state officials when it announced a one- to two-year delay in construc-
tion of the waste processing plant based on concerns that wastes could
not be safely moved to the $1.5 billion facility." 2 A similar dispute
occurred between Ohio officials and DOE over violations of an agree-
ment to cleanup the Fernald, Ohio uranium fuel processing center, the
plant that was the subject of the litigation that culminated in the
Supreme Court's decision in DOE v. Ohio.
III. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY V. OHIO
In U.S. Department of Energy v. Ohio," 3 the Supreme Court held
that Congress did not waive the United States' sovereign immunity
from liability to states for civil penalties under the Clean Water Act
and RCRA. The case began in 1986 when Ohio alleged that DOE's
uranium processing facility in Fernald, Ohio had violated the Clean
Water Act and RCRA. Emphasizing that the federal facilities provi-
sions of RCRA and the 1977 amendments to the Clean Water Act
were a response to Hancock and Water Resources Control Board, the
110. 42 U.S.C. § 6961 (1988).
111. Walters, 751 F.2d at 798.
112. Matthew L. Wald, Cleanup of Nuclear Waste at Arms Plant Is Postponed, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 6, 1991, at A12.
113. 112 S. Ct. 1627 (1992).
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district court found that both statutes waived federal sovereign immu-
nity from state civil penalties.1 14 With one judge dissenting, a panel of
the Sixth Circuit affirmed this decision, but held that the waiver of
immunity from civil penalties under RCRA could be found only in
RCRA's citizen suit provision and not in its federal facilities section.115
The Supreme Court then granted certiorari to review the Sixth Cir-
cuit's decision.
11 6
In DOE v. Ohio, the Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit's de-
cision and held that federal agencies are immune from civil penalties
for violations of the Clean Water Act and RCRA. The Court unani-
mously agreed with the Sixth Circuit's conclusion that the federal facil-
ities provision of RCRA did not waive federal immunity from civil
penalties. The Court refused to find that Congress intended to waive
federal immunity from "punitive fines" or penalties for past violations.
The DOE had conceded that there could be liability for "coercive
fines" or fines designed to alter behavior prospectively, such as those
imposed for violating an outstanding court order." 7 The Court was
unpersuaded that Congress had intended to authorize state imposition
of civil penalties in section 6001 of RCRA by mandating federal com-
pliance with "all" federal, state, interstate, and local requirements, and
by specifying that this included both substantive and procedural re-
quirements. The Court distinguished between compliance with these
requirements and the "mechanisms for enforcing" them." 8 Moreover,
the Court viewed the addition of language clarifying that these require-
ments included "any provisions for injunctive relief and such sanctions
as may be imposed by a court to enforce such relief" as indicating
congressional intent to limit the states to coercive sanctions and not to
include punitive ones." 9 The Court found support for this conclusion
in the final sentence of the federal facilities provision, which waives
immunity "from any process or sanction of any State or Federal Court
with respect to the enforcement of any such injunctive relief," but does
114. The district court's decision is reported as Ohio v. U.S. Dep't of Energy, 689 F.
Supp. 760 (S.D. Ohio 1988).
115. 904 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1990).
;16. 111 S. Ct. 2256 (1991).
117. 112 S. Ct. 1627 (1992).
118. Id. at 1640 n.17.
119. Id.
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not refer to any waiver with respect to penalties for past violations.120
With three Justices dissenting, the Court held that federal facilities
were also immune from punitive fines under the citizen suit provisions
of both RCRA and the Clean Water Act and under the federal facili-
ties provision of the Clean Water Act. Justice Souter, writing for the
majority, emphasized the traditional principle that waivers of sovereign
immunity "must be unequivocal" 121 and "must be 'construed strictly
in favor of the sovereign.' ,122 He then analyzed the citizen suit provi-
sions of both the Clean Water Act1 23 and RCRA,124 which expressly
authorize citizen suits "against any person (including... the United
States)... who is alleged to be in violation" of provisions of the laws.
The majority opinion confirmed that states are "citizens" and "per-
sons" authorized to sue federal facilities under the citizen suit provi-
sions of both acts. 25 However, despite language in each citizen suit
provision expressly authorizing courts to "apply any appropriate civil
penalties" under the civil penalties provisions of each statute,1 26 the
Court found that Congress had not waived federal sovereign immunity
with respect to such penalties.
The majority opinion conceded that the express reference to "the
United States" in the list of persons against whom citizen suits may be
brought makes it at least plausible that Congress intended to waive
federal sovereign immunity for civil penalties. The Court concluded,
however, that because the United States is not specifically included
120. Id. at 1633. Prior to enactment of the Federal Facility Compliance Act of
1992, § 6001 of RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6961, provided that federal facilities:
[S]hall be subject to, and comply with, all Federal, State, interstate, and local re-
quirements, both substantive and procedural (including any requirement for per-
mits or reporting or any provisions for injunctive relief and such sanctions as may be
imposed by a court to enforce such relief)... in the same manner, and to the same
extent, as any person is subject to such requirements .... Neither the United
States, nor any agency, employee, or officer thereof, shall be immune or exempt
from any process or sanction of any State or Federal Court with respect to the
enforcement of any such injunctive relief.
42 U.S.C. § 6961 (emphasis added).
121. 112 S. Ct. at 1633 (citing United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538-39
(1980)).
122. Id. (quoting McMahon v. United States, 342 U.S. 25, 27 (1951)).
123. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a).
124. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a).
125. 112 S. Ct. at 1634.
126. For the civil penalties provision of the Clean Water Act, see 33 U.S.C.
§ 1319(d). For the civil penalties provision of RCRA, see 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a), (g).
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within each statute's general definition of "persons ' 127 and because the
penalty provisions of each statute authorize imposition of civil penal-
ties on "persons," 2 ' Congress has not waived federal immunity from
such penalties with sufficient clarity and specificity. Dissenting from
this conclusion, Justice White, joined by Justices Blackmun and Ste-
vens, argued that it would be "impossible to fathom a clearer statement
that the United States could be sued and found liable for civil
penalties." '129
The majority also held that the federal facilities provision of the
Clean Water Act 30 does not waive federal immunity from civil penal-
ties. Unlike the federal facilities provision of RCRA, the Clean Water
Act provision does not contain any specific reference to sanctions to
enforce injunctive relief, which served as the basis for the conclusion
that the RCRA provision had waived federal immunity only for coer-
cive fines. Rather, the Clean Water Act refers "to any process and
sanction, whether enforced in Federal, State, or local courts or in any
other manner."' 31 The majority concluded, however, that because
"the text speaks of sanctions in the context of enforcing 'process' as
distinct from substantive 'requirements,'" it can "infer that Congress
was using 'sanction' in its coercive sense, to the exclusion of punitive
fines." 3 2 The majority also noted that the federal facilities provision
of the Clean Water Act qualifies its waiver of immunity with the state-
ment that "the United States shall be liable only for those civil penal-
127. See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(5) (defining "person" under the Clean Water Act); 42
U.S.C. § 6903(15) (defining "person" under RCRA).
128. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (Clean Water Act civil penalties provision); 42 U.S.C.
§ 6298(a), (g) (RCRA civil penalties provision).
129. 112 S. Ct. at 1642 (White, J., dissenting).
130. 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) provides that federal agencies:
[S]hall be subject to, and comply with, all Federal, State, interstate, and local re-
quirements, administrative authority, and process and sanctions respecting the
control and abatement of water pollution in the same manner... as any nongov-
ernmental entity .... The preceding sentence shall apply (A) to any requirement
whether substantive or procedural (including any recordkeeping or reporting re-
quirement, any requirement respecting permits and any other requirement, whatso-
ever), (B) to the exercise of any Federal, State, or local administrative authority,
and (C) to any process and sanction, whether enforced in Federal, State, or local
courts or in any other manner.... TThe United States shall be liable only for those
civil penalties arising under Federal law or imposed by a State or local court to
enforce an order or the process of such court.
33 U.S.C. § 1323(a).
131. Id.
132. DOE v. Ohio, 112 S. Ct. at 1637.
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ties arising under Federal law or imposed by a State or local court to
enforce an order or the process of such court." '133 While noting that
this speaks of "civil penalties" rather than "sanctions," the majority
held that immunity from civil penalties has not been waived because
even violations of permits issued by a state with federally delegated
authority to operate the Clean Water Act's NPDES permit program do
not "arise under Federal law." '134 With remarkable candor, Justice
Souter conceded that this interpretation renders the phrase "civil pen-
alties arising under federal law" curiously meaningless. 135 But he con-
cluded that the presumption favoring narrow construction of waivers
of sovereign immunity warranted such a result.'36 The dissenting Jus-
tices criticized this position as tantamount " 'to imput[ing] to Congress
a desire for incoherence' as a basis for rejecting an explicit waiver. 137
The majority rejected Ohio's policy arguments for construing the
congressional waiver of sovereign immunity more broadly. Respond-
ing to the argument that states had not been and could not be success-
ful in gaining facility compliance without the penalty deterrent, 38
Justice Souter opined that such a position "assume[s] that without
sanctions for past conduct a federal polluter can never be brought into
future compliance, that an agency of the National Government would
defy an injunction backed by coercive fines and even a threat of per-
sonal commitment." In his dissenting opinion, Justice White, the au-
thor of the majority opinions in both Hancock and Water Resources
Control Board, did not argue that the Court's decision made federal
facility compliance impossible, but rather that it "deprives the states of
a powerful weapon in combatting federal agencies that persist in de-
spoiling the environment."' 139
133. 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a).
134. 112 S. Ct. at 1638-39.
135. "Perhaps [Congress] used it just in case some later amendment might waive
the government's immunity from punitive sanctions. Perhaps a drafter mistakenly
thought that liability for such sanctions had somehow been waived already. Perhaps
someone was careless. The question has no satisfactory answer." Id. at 1639.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1644.
138. Brief for Respondent at 35, DOE v. Ohio, 112 S. Ct. 1627 (1992) Nos. 90-1341
& 90-1517.
139. DOE v. Ohio, 112 S. Ct. at 1638.
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IV. THE FEDERAL FACILITY COMPLIANCE ACT OF 1992
Just as it had overturned Hancock and Water Resources Control
Board, Congress acted swiftly to override part of the holding in DOE v.
Ohio by enacting new legislation. On October 6, 1992, President Bush
signed into law the Federal Facility Compliance Act of 1992
(FFCA), "o which expressly waives the federal government's immunity
from civil penalties for violations of RCRA. Since 1988, Congress had
been considering legislation to improve enforcement against federal fa-
cilities. The House had approved such legislation by large margins on
two occasions prior to the passage of FFCA. In 1989, the House ap-
proved legislation clarifying that federal facilities were not immune
from civil penalties for RCRA violations by a vote of 380 to 39. None-
theless, the bill died in the Senate after being reported out of commit-
tee.' 4 ' The legislation that became the Federal Facility Compliance
Act of 1992 actually passed both houses of Congress during the previ-
ous session in 1991, prior to the Supreme Court's decision in DOE v.
Ohio.'4 2 The Court's decision served as a catalyst for convening a con-
ference committee and achieving final passage of the legislation.
Supporters of the Federal Facility Compliance Act maintained that
the legislation was essential to clarify the original intent of Congress to
waive sovereign immunity for civil penalties.' 3 They expressed regret
that it was necessary to adopt legislation to return the law to what they
140. Pub. L. No. 102-386, 106 Stat. 1505 (1992).
141. See Elizabeth K. Hocking, Federal Facility Violations of the Resource Conser-
vation and Recovery Act and the Questionable Role of Sovereign Immunity, 5 ADMIN.
L.J. 203, 222-23 (1991).
142. H.R. 2194, the bill that became the Federal Facility Compliance Act, was ap-
proved by voice vote in the House of Representatives on June 24, 1991, after having
been reported out of the House Energy and Commerce Committee on June 4 by a vote
of 42-1. 137 CONG. REc. H4878 (daily ed. June 24, 1991). The Senate approved similar
legislation on October 24, 1991 by a 94-3 vote, after a filibuster by Senators concerned
about opposition from DOE and DOD was broken by an 85-14 cloture vote on October
17, 1991. See 137 CONG. REC. S15,122 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1991); 137 CONG. REc.
S14,865 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1991).
143. See, eg., 138 CONG. REC. H9136 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1992) (statement of Rep.
Swift); 138 CONG. REc. S14,755 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1992) (statement of Sen. Mitchell)
("This legislation will return to the States the enforcement tools we thought we had
given them in 1976."); 137 CONG. REc. S15,136 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1991) (statement of
Sen. Metzenbaum) (stating that the "bill simply reaffirms Congress' original intent that
States can impose and collect fines and penalties from Federal agencies and Depart-
ments for violations committed under State and Federal hazardous waste law."); 137
CONG. REc. S15,135 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1991) (statement of Sen. Durenburger); 137
CONG. REC. S14,866 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1991) (statement of Sen. Mitchell).
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thought it had been when RCRA was enacted. 1" As described below,
DOE and DOD officials claimed that it was impossible for them to
comply fully with the environmental laws. This, coupled with the
threat of a presidential veto, caused Congress to qualify the legisla-
tion's sovereign immunity waiver.145 However, the politically irresisti-
ble notion that the environmental laws should apply equally to public
and private entities generated overwhelming support for the Act.
The Senate committee report on the legislation described the princi-
ple that federal agencies must comply with the nation's environmental
laws in the same manner as all other persons as a "cornerstone of Fed-
eral environmental law." The FFCA implements this principle by
amending section 6001 of RCRA to waive federal sovereign immunity
for civil or administrative penalties or fines, regardless of whether they
are "punitive or coercive in nature or are imposed for isolated, inter-
mittent, or continuing violations." 14 6  This amendment effectively
overrides the Supreme Court's unanimous holding in DOE v. Ohio that
the previous version of section 6001 did not waive federal sovereign
immunity for punitive penalties. The FFCA also amended the defini-
tion of "person" in section 1004(15) of RCRA to "include each depart-
ment, agency, and instrumentality of the United States," thus
effectively overriding the Court's holding that federal facilities are im-
mune from civil penalties under RCRA's citizen suit provision.1 47 The
144. See, e.g., 138 CONG. REC. H9138 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1992) (statement of Rep.
Eckart) ("In my view, it should not have even been necessary. But a recent Supreme
Court decision affecting my State, Dept of Energy v. Ohio, a decision that I believe was
erroneous in its application, made it clear that the Congress indeed had to act.").
145. See 138 CONG. Rac. S14,755 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1992) (remarks of Sen.
Mitchell):
I would have been comfortable with a simple clarification that sovereign immunity
is waived, but the Departments of Defense and Energy claim that they cannot
comply with the law as now written. We, therefore, responded to the administra-
tion's repeated requests that Federal agencies be given special consideration in four
separate areas.
Id.
146. S. REP. No. 67, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1991). To clarify that RCRA's waiver
of sovereign immunity extends to all waste management activities, including generation,
transportation, storage or treatment, and not just to disposal, the FFCA inserts the
words "and management" in the first sentence of RCRA's federal facilities provision
before the words "in the same manner." Cf. Stever, supra note 88, at 10,117 (finding
that sovereign immunity should be waived for all management activities).
147. To prevent the threat of civil penalties from deterring federal employees from
performing their official duties, the Act provides that federal agents, officers, and em-
ployees shall not be held personally liable for civil penalties with respect to acts within
the scope of their official duties. The Act does provide that federal employees may be
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FFCA does not address, however, the Court's holdings with respect to
waivers of sovereign immunity in the Clean Water Act.148
Responding to concerns that states could abuse their civil penalty
authority to line their coffers at federal expense, the legislation requires
that all funds collected by states for violations by federal agencies be
used "only for projects designed to improve or protect the environment
or to defray the costs of environmental protection or enforcement."
While the term "environmental protection" is not defined in the
FFCA, supporters of the Act maintained that it should be construed
broadly to include wetlands protection and preservation of open
spaces, as well as pollution control. 149 The requirement does not apply
to states with preexisting laws or constitutional provisions that bar
earmarking of funds collected in enforcement actions.
The Departments of Energy and Defense opposed the legislation, ar-
guing that their facilities produce so many diverse hazardous waste
streams that full compliance with RCRA is impossible. These agencies
maintained that the technology simply does not exist to ensure the safe
treatment and disposal of many radioactive wastes they generate. To
accommodate these concerns, the legislative waiver of sovereign immu-
nity is not effective immediately for federal agencies who store radioac-
tive waste that has been mixed with other hazardous waste (mixed
waste) in violation of RCRA's prohibition on storage of hazardous
waste that has been banned from land disposal.15° The Act gives fed-
eral agencies storing mixed wastes not subject to an approved treat-
ment plan and compliance order three years (or until October 1995)
before the waiver of immunity from civil penalties becomes effective.
The waiver is effective immediately for violations of existing compli-
ance agreements, permits, or orders governing the storage of mixed
waste. 151
The three year delay in the effective date of the waiver of sovereign
subject to criminal sanctions for violations of federal or state hazardous waste laws, but
it specifies that federal agencies, departments, or instrumentalities may not be subjected
to criminal penalties in their institutional capacities.
148. As a result, DOE v. Ohio will continue to bar the imposition of civil penalties
on federal agencies for violations of the Clean Water Act. See, e.g., Sierra Club v.
Interior Dep't, 972 F.2d 312 (10th Cir. 1992).
149. 138 CONG. REc. S14,759 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1992) (remarks of Sen. Chafee).
150. RCRA § 6001(c)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 6961(c)(3) (1988), amended by Federal Facil-
ity Compliance Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-386, 106 Stat. 1505 (1992).
151. RCRA § 6000(c)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 6961(c)(4) (1988), amended by Federal Facil-
ity Compliance Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-386, 106 Stat. 1505 (1992).
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immunity for storage violations involving mixed waste was a compro-
mise adopted to prevent a presidential veto of the legislation. Because
Congress did not intend the provision to extend existing sovereign im-
munity, injunctive relief will remain available for violations of section
3004(j) in the interim. While DOE has petitioned EPA for a one year,
case-by-case variance from the RCRA land ban for mixed waste, the
conference report indicates that the Act's delay of the effective dates
for fines and penalties for section 3004(j) violations obviates any need
for such a waiver.
The Federal Facility Compliance Act also includes provisions to
force DOE to develop a plan for cleaning up the enormous quantities
of mixed waste it already has generated. They require the Secretary of
Energy to provide EPA and the governor of each state where DOE
stores or generates mixed wastes with a comprehensive state-by-state
inventory of the sources and amounts of such wastes. This inventory is
to include a five year estimate of the amount of each type of mixed
waste that DOE expects to generate at each facility and information
concerning the technology available for treating such wastes. The Act
requires DOE to submit a detailed description of its plans for treating
mixed wastes and for identifying and developing treatment technolo-
gies for wastes for which no treatment technology currently exists.
Either EPA or states with delegated RCRA program authority must
review and approve the plans, which are then to be incorporated in
administrative orders requiring compliance with the plans.152
To improve EPA enforcement, the Act also amends section 3007(c)
of RCRA to require EPA to inspect annually each federal facility used
for the treatment, storage, or disposal of hazardous waste even in states
authorized to administer the RCRA program.153 The 1984 Hazardous
and Solid Waste Amendments had previously required EPA to make
such inspections only in states without delegated program authority.
The federal agency that owns or operates the facility must reimburse
EPA for the costs of such inspection. The initial EPA inspection must
include groundwater monitoring unless it has been performed during
the year prior to enactment.
152. RCRA § 3021, amended by Federal Facility Compliance Act of 1992, Pub. L.
No. 102-386, 106 Stat. 1505 (1992). The Act also requires the General Accounting
Office to submit a report to Congress on the DOE's compliance with these new require-
ments by April 6, 1994.
153. RCRA § 3007(c), 42 U.S.C. § 6927(c), amended by Federal Facility Compli-
ance Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-386, 106 Stat. 1505 (1992).
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A particularly significant provision in FFCA is its express authoriza-
tion for EPA to bring administrative enforcement actions against other
federal agencies. While EPA had contended that it had such authority
under RCRA, the Justice Department maintained that it would violate
constitutional principles of separation of powers for EPA to issue ad-
ministrative orders against another executive agency, a position under-
mined by Morrison v. Olson.'54 The Conference report describes the
Act's express endorsement of EPA administrative enforcement actions
against federal facilities as an effort "to reaffirm the original intent" of
RCRA.' 55 The report states that EPA should use its section 3008(a)
administrative order authority against federal facilities for the same
types of violations for which it is used against private parties. 5 6 EPA
had complained that other federal agencies were reluctant to negotiate
compliance agreements because EPA had no credible threat of enforce-
ment leverage to use against them in the absence of such an agreement.
With the use of its new administrative enforcement authority, EPA
will be able to move more rapidly to penalize recalcitrant agencies.
The FFCA requires that EPA give a defendant agency an opportunity
to confer with the EPA Administrator before any administrative order
can become final.
To respond to concerns expressed by the Department of Defense, the
Act requires EPA to clarify when military munitions become a hazard-
ous waste regulated under RCRA Subtitle C.'57 To ease concerns
about the application of Subtitle C to military vessels that generate and
store hazardous waste, the Act exempts wastes generated on public
vessels from RCRA until transferred to a shore facility unless the
waste is stored on the vessel for more than ninety days after the vessel
is no longer in service. 158 At DOD's behest, the Act also extends
RCRA's domestic sewage exclusion to apply to federally owned waste-
water treatment works.' 59 This will exempt from RCRA regulation
hazardous waste placed in sewage systems served by such treatment
154. 487 U.S. 654, 695-96 (1988).
155. 138 CONG. REC. H8865 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1992) (conference committee
statement).
156. Id.
157. RCRA § 3004(y), 42 U.S.C. § 6924(y), amended by Federal Facilities Compli-
ance Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-386, 106 Stat. 1505 (1992).
158. RCRA § 3022, amended by Federal Facility Compliance Act of 1992, Pub. L.
No. 102-386, 106 Stat. 1505 (1992).
159. RCRA § 3023, amended by Federal Facility Compliance Act of 1992, Pub. L.
No. 102-386, 106 Stat. 1505 (1992).
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works. The Conference report states that this is not to be interpreted
"as an endorsement of the domestic sewage exclusion," which Con-
gress pledges to revisit in the future. 1"
The central purpose of the Federal Facility Compliance Act is to
overturn the Supreme Court's decision in DOE v. Ohio and to "reaffirm
the original intent of Congress that each department, agency, and in-
strumentality of the United States be subject to all of the provisions" of
federal, state, or local solid and hazardous waste regulations.16 While
the legislation effectively overrules the DOE v. Ohio Court's holding
concerning RCRA, the scope of the congressional waiver of sovereign
immunity is even broader than the penalties at issue in that decision. It
makes the federal government subject "to the full range of available
enforcement tools . . . to penalize isolated, intermittent or continuing
violations as well as to coerce future compliance." This provision ef-
fectively precludes assertion by federal defendants of a Gwaltney de-
fense in citizen suits alleging violations of RCRA.162
In Gwaltney the Supreme Court held that citizen enforcement suits
under the Clean Water Act could not be brought for wholly past viola-
tions. The Court stated that the language of section 505 of the Act,
which authorizes suits against any person "alleged to be in violation"
of the Act, required plaintiffs to make at least a "good faith allegation
of continuous or intermittent violation" in order for a court to hear the
case. By barring federal facilities from asserting a Gwaltney defense,
Congress has indicated its belief in the importance of penalizing past
violations as a means for promoting the goals of general deterrence. 163
160. 138 CONG. REc. H8868 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1992) (conference committee
statement).
161. 138 CONG. REc. H8864 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1992) (conference committee
reports).
162. As the Conference report explains:
By subjecting the federal government to penalties and fines for isolated, intermit-
tent, or continuing violations, the waiver also makes it clear that the federal gov-
ernment may be penalized for any violation of federal, state, interstate or local law
whether a single or repeated occurrence, notwithstanding the holding of the
Supreme Court in Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation,
Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (1987).
Id.
163. In a statement issued upon signing the Federal Facility Compliance Act, Presi-
dent Bush maintained that Congress could not overrule Gwaltney legislatively because
the decision "rested in part on constitutional principles of standing and mootness."
Statement on Signing Legislation Waiving Federal Immunity Relating to Solid and
Hazardous Waste, 28 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1869 (Oct. 6, 1992). To support this
position, the President's signing statement cited a portion of a concurring opinion in
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Taken as a whole, the FFCA is a powerful reaffirmation by Congress
of the principle that the environmental laws should apply equally to
private and public entities. In the FFCA Congress rejected the
Supreme Court's attempts to limit this principle only to application of
the requirements and procedures of the laws and reaffirmed its inten-
tion to extend the principle also to the enforcement mechanisms avail-
able under RCRA. By removing uncertainty concerning the
enforcement mechanisms states may use against federal facilities, the
legislation should facilitate state efforts to bring federal facilities into
compliance with hazardous waste regulations. Even those who argued
that this uncertainty could have been avoided by better use of interpre-
tive principles conceded that new legislation would be necessary to sat-
isfactorily resolve the discrepancies in language between the federal
facilities provisions in the various environmental laws."'
While the enactment of the FFCA overrides the holding of DOE v.
Ohio with respect to RCRA, it does not address the question of federal
immunity under the Clean Water Act. This does not in any way reflect
congressional support for the Court's conclusion that federal facilities
are immune from punitive penalties under the Clean Water Act.
Rather, it reflects the fact that the federal facilities legislation pending
before a conference committee at the time DOE v. Ohio was announced
addressed only RCRA. Legislation amending the Clean Water Act
falls within the jurisdiction of a different set of congressional commit-
tees. Many people in the environmental community had assumed that
courts would interpret the Clean Water Act's waiver of sovereign im-
munity to authorize states to recover civil penalties, particularly be-
Gwaltney, where Justice Scalia argued that if a defendant had come into compliance by
the time a suit was filed, citizen plaintiffs would have "no remediable injury in fact that
could support suit." Id. (citing 484 U.S. 49, 70 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and con-
curring in judgment)). However, this extreme view of the standing doctrine was re-
jected by the Gwaltney majority, 484 U.S. at 65-67, and by the Fourth Circuit on
remand. Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 890 F.2d 690, 698
(4th Cir. 1989). Justice Scalia's attempts to interpret the redressability prong of stand-
ing doctrine in a manner that would greatly limit access to the courts have not com-
manded a majority of the Court, as indicated most recently in Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992), where a majority of the Court found that citizen plain-
tiffs lacked standing, but only three justices joined Justice Scalia's opinion on the redres-
sability issue. Moreover, the President's constitutional objection to the reversal of
Gwaltney in the Federal Facility Compliance Act is particularly inapposite because civil
penalties in state enforcement actions will be paid to the states, unlike the situation
discussed by Justice Scalia in Gwaltney where civil penalties imposed in a citizen suit are
returned to the federal treasury rather than being paid to the plaintiffs.
164. Murchison, supra note 11, at 202, 210.
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cause Congress adopted the 1977 Amendments to the Act to override
the Supreme Court's decision in Water Resources Control Board. If
anything, the enactment of the FFCA virtually guarantees that similar
legislation waiving federal immunity from civil penalties will be
adopted when the Clean Water Act is reauthorized, perhaps in the next
session of Congress.
While the Court's decision in DOE v. Ohio served as a catalyst for
amending RCRA, it increased the administration's leverage during fi-
nal negotiations on the FFCA by placing the burden of inaction on
those seeking a waiver of sovereign immunity from civil penalties. As a
result, DOE and DOD were successful in winning a three year delay in
the effective date of the sovereign immunity waiver for violations in-
volving storage of mixed waste. While this establishes a temporary
statutory exception to the principle of equal application of the law to
public and private entities, it appears to have been a necessary compro-
mise in order to avoid a presidential veto. Because the FFCA's ex-
panded waiver of immunity is prospective in nature, DOE v. Ohio also
eliminates any prospect of recovery of civil penalties in cases pending
at the time of the decision. However, noncompliance at federal facili-
ties is so widespread that states and citizen groups are likely to file suit
seeking civil penalties for violations in the near future. Even the three
year delay in the effective date of the waiver of immunity with respect
to mixed waste violations will not insulate facilities from immediate
liability for violating existing compliance agreements. Coupled with
the EPA's new administrative order authority that gives the agency
more leverage in dealing with sister agencies, it is likely that previously
unenforceable interagency agreements will be replaced with compli-
ance orders enforceable in court by states and citizen groups.165 While
the FFCA will not have much impact on criminal enforcement, the
controversy brewing over the Rocky Flats plea bargain may generate
renewed pressure for more aggressive criminal enforcement against
egregious federal violators.
By waiving sovereign immunity for civil penalties, the FFCA re-
stores an essential tool for enforcement against federal agencies that
violate RCRA. However, it is far from clear how powerful the pros-
pect of civil penalties will be in inducing compliance by federal agen-
cies. The penalties heretofore sought from federal agencies under
165. Telephone interview with Melinda Kassen, Environmental Defense Fund (Oct.
12, 1992).
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RCRA have been remarkably small.166 Moreover, there is considera-
ble uncertainty concerning where the funds will come from to pay such
penalties. While the House committee report indicated that the Justice
Department's judgment fund would be the source for payment of pen-
alties in contested cases, President Bush's signing statement on the
FFCA specifies that "fines or penalties imposed as a result of this legis-
lation will be paid from agency appropriations, unless otherwise re-
quired by law."' 67  President Bush maintained that payment of
penalties from the Justice Department's judgment fund "would take
away the coercive effect penalties might have on the agencies and turn
the waiver of sovereign immunity into a revenue sharing program."'' 68
However, if this policy makes penalties more difficult to collect from
federal agencies, it could dilute some of the force of the FFCA. Ulti-
mately, an effective remedy for environmental violations by federal fa-
cilities will require the combination of an executive branch truly
committed to compliance with the environmental laws and a Congress
willing to appropriate the funds necessary to overcome decades of will-
ful neglect.
V. CONCLUSION: INTERPRETIVE FORMALISM AND THE
IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF PUBLIC LAW
By repeatedly overriding the Supreme Court's narrow interpreta-
tions of waivers of sovereign immunity in the environmental laws, Con-
gress has indicated that the traditional, private law principle that such
waivers are to be narrowly construed has diminished vitality in public
law contexts. The legislation overriding DOE v. Ohio, Hancock, and
Water Resources Control Board, repudiates judicial decisions that were
founded on application of this interpretive principle to trump argu-
ments in support of equal application of the environmental laws to
public and private entities. Yet the explosive growth of public law to
protect the environment reflects a commitment to making government
agencies more responsive to the beneficiaries of regulation by subject-
ing such agencies to legal sanctions when they violate the law or fail to
166. The House committee report on the FFCA identifies 27 instances in which
states sought civil penalties against federal facilities under RCRA. The amounts ranged
from $61 to S 125,000 with an average penalty of $4,750. H.R. REP. No. 111, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 128.
167. Statement on Signing Legislation Waiving Federal Immunity Relating to Solid
and Hazardous Waste, 28 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1869 (Oct. 6, 1992).
168. Id.
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perform their statutory responsibilities. By employing interpretive
principles that narrowly construe legislative waivers of sovereign im-
munity, the Court forced Congress to spell out its intentions with
greater precision; a laudable goal, but one that has been achieved only
at a high cost given the consequences of the Court's decisions for the
implementation and enforcement of public law. 69 The decisions con-
tributed to a pattern of resistance and delayed compliance by federal
facilities that has culminated in truly horrendous environmental con-
tamination problems at many of them.170
Ironically, the very ambiguities or omissions that the Court cited in
defense of its narrow interpretations appear to be largely the product of
the piecemeal manner in which Congress updates the environmental
laws. Although Congress consistently has sought to embrace the prin-
ciple of equal application of the environmental laws to federal facilities
when reauthorizing major environmental statutes, the greater specific-
ity of the language inserted into the newly reauthorized statutes can
always be cited as a reason for inferring that the older statutes should
not be construed as broadly.'71  Thus, while "the year in which the
169. The litigation that culminated in Hancock and Water Resources Control Bd.
effectively prevented states from regulating federal facilities under the Clean Air Act
and Clean Water Act until seven years after their initial enactment. While Congress
responded by amending these laws a year after the decisions, litigation over the ability
of states to impose civil penalties on federal facilities has continued to make effective
enforcement against them difficult. Immunity from civil penalties substantially reduced
the incentives for federal agencies to obey the environmental laws. Only after a court
imposed an equitable remedy would federal facilities face any credible threat of being
penalized for environmental violations. Thus, Ohio officials were correct when they
argued that civil penalties are an essential component of the regulatory scheme because
they are necessary to deter illegal activity at federal facilities. Cf. Murchison, supra
note 11, at 223 ("By relying on a dubious rule of strict construction and failing to place
the statutory language in historical context, the federal courts have substantially as-
sisted the executive agencies in delaying for more than two decades the environmental
compliance that Congress has ordered.").
170. As Justice Stevens has argued:
In the domain of statutory interpretation, Congress is the master. It obviously has
the power to correct our mistakes, but we do the country a disservice when we
needlessly ignore persuasive evidence of Congress' actual purpose and require it "to
take the time to revisit the matter" and to restate its purpose in more precise Eng-
lish whenever its work product suffers from an omission or inadvertent error.
West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 111 S. Ct. 1138, 1155 (1991) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
171. See, e.g., DOE v. Ohio, 112 S. Ct. at 1634 n.12 (noting that the Medical Waste
Tracking Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. § 6992e(b) (1988) uses more specific language to define
the term "person" as including the United States).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol43/iss1/8
OVERCOMING INTERPRETIVE FORMALISM
respective provisions were last amended provides the best explanation
of differing statutory language," 172 courts narrowly construing waivers
of sovereign immunity could find a basis for frustrating Congress' ef-
forts to provide effective enforcement mechanisms against federal facil-
ities. This principle of statutory construction, coupled with the
ingenuity of federal agencies, meant that the early overrides were less
successful than Congress anticipated because they often solved the
problem of the last judicial decision instead of anticipating new
disputes. 171
Cass Sunstein has argued that courts should employ a new set of
interpretive principles in construing regulatory legislation in order to
reflect the consequences of the shift from private law to public law re-
gimes. 174 Among the interpretive principles that he deems obsolete in
light of the ascendance of public law is the principle that statutes abro-
gating sovereign immunity should be narrowly construed.1 75 The con-
cerns upon which this principle is founded are not present when federal
agencies engage in activities proscribed by public law. Thus, it would
be more appropriate for courts to reverse the presumption and to re-
fuse to recognize federal immunity under the environmental laws in the
absence of clear congressional intent to authorize it. This conclusion is
supported by the consistent history of congressional efforts to apply
environmental legislation to public and private entities alike, with nar-
row exemptions authorized for federal facilities only in extraordinary
circumstances.
While the DOE v. Ohio Court did not discuss Ohio's arguments in
favor of a broader rule of construction of sovereign immunity waivers,
in other cases the Court has indicated some willingness to eschew pri-
vate law principles of statutory construction in public law contexts.
For example, in Bowen v. City of New York the Court commented that
it "must be careful not to 'assume the authority to narrow the waiver
that Congress intended,' or construe the waiver 'unduly restric-
172. Murchison, supra note 11, at 186.
173. Murchison, supra note 11, at 202.
174. For a detailed description of these arguments, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFrER
THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE (1990) [herein-
after AFrER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION]; Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the
Regulatory State, 103 HARv. L. REV. 405 (1989) [hereinafter Interpreting Statutes].
175. See Interpreting Statutes, supra note 173, at 506; AFtER THE RIGHTs
REVOLUTION, supra note 174, at 236.
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tively.' ))176 Citing this language, the Court in Irwin v. Veterans' Ad-
ministration announced that when Congress has waived sovereignimmunity, rules of equitable tolling should be applicable to suits
against the government in the same way that they are applicable to
suits against private parties. 177 In similar fashion, the Court should
reverse the traditional presumption in favor of narrow construction of
waivers of sovereign immunity to require clear congressional intent
before public entities are exempted from environmental laws applicable
to private parties.
The Supreme Court's constructions of sovereign immunity waivers
in the environmental statutes are not the only Court decisions in the
environmental area which Congress has overridden. 178 While they
have been of some value in encouraging Congress to update and clarify
the laws, 179 the Court's decisions narrowly interpreting sovereign im-
munity waivers in the environmental statutes have delayed implemen-
tation and enforcement of the laws by employing interpretive principles
ill-suited to the public law domain in which the modern environmental
statutes operate. Application of a less formalistic approach to interpre-
tation of the environmental statutes would promote the goals of public
law and avoid the need for Congress to continue to override grudging
judicial interpretations of the laws.
176. Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 479 (1986) (quoting United States
v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 118 (1979)).
177. Irwin v. Veterans' Admin., 111 S. Ct. 453, 457 (1990).
178. William Eskridge identifies nine Supreme Court decisions in environmental
cases that have been overridden at least in part by Congress since 1977: Exxon Corp. v.
Hunt, 475 U.S. 355 (1986); Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. NRDC, 470 U.S. 116 (1985);
Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49 (1984); Middlesex
County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981); Hancock
v. Train, 426 U.S. 167 (1976); Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143
(8th Cir. 1971), aff'd, 405 U.S. 1035 (1972); Fri v. Sierra Club, 349 F. Supp. 253
(D.D.C. 1982), aff'g by an equally divided Court, 412 U.S. 541 (1983). See Eskridge,
supra note 9, at 424-37 (1991). As noted above, this list should also include the override
of Water Resources Control Bd. by the 1977 Clean Water Act Amendments.
179. See Eskridge, supra note 9, at 407, 413.
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